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William H. Overholt

The ability of peasants to organize or to be organized, and the relationship which their organizations adopt toward other institutions of the society, are critical to the future of any developing nation. Peasant organizations will determine in many cases whether societies will experience revolutionary upheaval, and they will heavily determine the consequences of such upheaval. The ability of the peasants to organize, or of the government to organize the peasants, will determine the degree to which attempts at land reform will succeed or fail, because no central government can implement land reform without the organized political backing of the peasantry and without access to the peasants' detailed knowledge of land boundaries, land productivity, and all of the other information crucial to fair distribution. Peasant organizations will also constitute a principal determinant of whether agrarian development programs can succeed; if the peasants are alienated from the government, new irrigation ditches will deteriorate, new strain of rice and forms of fertilizer will not be used, and government attempts to obtain necessary information will be defeated.

In those countries where democratic institutions prevail, the peasants will constitute a fundamental influence on government to the extent that they organize themselves or allow themselves to be organized by non-peasants. If they remain unorganized, then they remain outside the system and alienated from that system--a situation which, given their numerical preponderance in the society, renders democratic institutions totally unstable and totally ineffective. If they allow themselves to be organized

Peasant Organization in the Philippines

Historically, in the Philippines as elsewhere, the preponderance of noteworthy peasant political organization has consisted of periodic, abortive flare-ups occurred throughout the Philippine archipelago in areas of high tenancy and low tenancy, of relative prosperity and of relative poverty. They occurred both in the centralized, hierarchical Spanish administration and in the American administration which relied heavily on decentralized local political controls. David Sturtevant notes that, "Throughout the centuries of Spanish control, local or regional insurrections occurred somewhere on the archipelago on the average of once every twenty years." Most of them were examples of nativism, millennialism, or social banditry or else were outgrowths of secret societies and radical political associations.* The earliest peasant outbreaks had predominantly religious overtones, often reacting against the imposition of Spanish Catholicism. They were led by nativistic religious figures, who usually claimed miraculous powers and a special relationship with the supernatural world. Some of these, as Sturtevant notes, were stimulated by Spanish economic policies or by mal-administration. In all cases they were repressed by the Spanish authorities.

When suppression had been successful, and also in those densely populated low lands of Luzon where Spanish power precluded overt revolt, social banditry became widespread and a Robin Hood tradition developed in the barrios. The most prominent bandits followed the leaders of the major revolts in generally claiming miraculous powers.

* David R. Sturtevant, "Peasant Movements in the Philippines: Regional Configurations." Much of what follows is adopted from this paper and from Sturtevant's oral remarks.

discontents was quickly adopted by the Sakdal Party which claimed 75,000 to 150,000 members and won a number of electoral victories prior to a 1935 insurrection, the consequence of which was the crushing of the movement. The feat of the Sakdalistas left a clear path for the rise of the purely secular Socialist Party which dominated Luzon peasant politics from 1935 until World War II.

As Sturtevant points out, the peasant movements before the 1930s were present under a broad variety of economic conditions and among major linguistic groups. They advocated neither overthrow of the government nor redistribution of the land. Their connecting thread was religious mysticism responding to cultural tensions. After the 1930s, peasant movements became increasingly secular, political, and more continuous in their organization, and they came to reflect urban/rural coalitions rather than purely rural uprisings. Given these trends, it was not surprising that the Japanese invasion produced a coalition between the Socialist Party and a rising Communist Party, in addition to somewhat less effective anti-Japanese rural movements in other regions of the Philippines. This anti-Japanese movement became an effective base for a post-World War II insurgency.

Simultaneously, another form of urban/rural coalition began to develop, a form that was unprecedented because it represented peasant political organization on a large scale which cooperated with central authority rather than rising against it. Beginning very early in the American period, elections were held and the results of elections determined decisions of great importance to the peasantry, including the nature and distribution of public works programs. As a result, a very extensive

A second level of peasant organization, developed cooperatively with the government, has consisted of officially stimulated rural development organizations and their private counterparts. Many of these have simply become paper organizations. A vast array of Lions Clubs, Puericulture Societies, and so forth, exists throughout the archipelago only on paper and in the minds of those urban figures who sought to spread them. Likewise, an extremely high proportion of the sponsored agricultural development programs have been reduced to shadows or to outright failures-- including such dramatic failures as the Farmers Cooperative Marketing Associations.* More successful have been small private or government-organized associations of farmers for promotion and management of irrigation.**

Under the Martial Law regime, which began in 1972, many of the government-promoted rural organization concepts have taken on new life and vitality. The Marcos land reform program has been accompanied by a vigorous agrarian development program based upon farmers associations, called Samahang Nayons, and other village level organizations. Samahang Nayons join cooperatives and guarantee the land amortization payments of their members. Moreover, the political process has come to be based upon ratification of the broadest Martial Law policies through the voting of village level barangays. So far, such organizations are weak and heavily

* Cf. William H. Overholt, "Land Reform in the Philippines," Asian Survey XVI, 5 (May 1976).

**For more detailed descriptions of these and other past and present rural organizations, cf. E.J. Tavanlar's paper for the SEADAG Seminar, "Peasant Organizations in Southeast Asia--Their Role in Agrarian Reform."

the democratic period their direct influence on political and social policy was at best marginal. During the Martial Law period their demonstrations have been suppressed, but many of their leaders have received assistance from the President himself and have acquired direct access to the President and substantial influence over agrarian policies. Surprisingly, even the peasant-organizing activities of former Hukbalahap Supremo, Luis Taruc, have been financed directly by the President of the Philippines, and his organizing activities are permitted even in such unlikely places as Camp Olivas (a military base). On the one hand, this government support of the mass peasant organizations co-opts those organizations and their leadership. On the other hand, it gives them a direct influence over policy, and a potential for long-range power which is likely to have far-reaching consequences.

Indonesia

As in the Philippines, traditional peasant movements in Indonesia were typically milinarian or religious rather than political and usually locally organized and locally oriented rather than nationally. Rural Java experienced major local rebellions in 1845, 1868, 1871, 1886, 1888, 1904 and 1907. But as occurred elsewhere, strong trends towards politicization and nationalization of peasant movements developed in the twentieth century. These trends were underlain by reactions against colonial rule--and particularly by reactions against various kinds of taxes which caused widespread peasant indebtedness and by the twentieth century Dutch introduction of a legal right for landlords on so-called private lands to evict tenants at will for nonpayment of dues. Despite the strong similarities in these overall trends toward politicization and nationalization,

ports through the coastal areas and inland river valleys, coming to dominate those areas most assessible to trade and least controlled by the Hindu kingdoms. The Islamic traders were threatened by Western colonialism from the beginning and thus became the basis of the earliest anti-colonial movements.

In the case of those few groups never absorbed into the Islamic community, and in the case of the majority of Javanese who are only nominally Moslem, Dutch cooptation of the urban leadership (that is the local aristocracy known as priaji), caused the loss of their position of social and political leadership. The priaji adopted colonial concepts of property, morality, proper social roles and sources of status. The priaji became agents of Dutch rule and objects of hatred and terror to the common people. Without the priaji leadership, however, the non-Moslems and nominal Moslems lacked social leadership, social institutions and structured social relationships. Peasant society in these areas therefore became a set of free-floating groups susceptible to organization by secular nationalist and communist political leaders.

The situation in the Moslem areas was quite different. The Moslem leaders retained their local and non-Western outlook while the priaji were coming under the influence of the Dutch. And, as the influence of the priaji declined, the Islamic leaders rose in power and the Moslem communities became cohesive social organizations with both strong village ties and a sense of community that transcended local ties. Indonesian nationalism came to center on these Moslem loyalties and organizations, with the trading interests of the Islamic merchants and the religious sentiments

From 1945 on, the relatively liberal Masjumi Party was an important political force, and from its founding in 1952 the Nahdatul Ulama was a major conservative political force. The religious, legal, social, political, educational and landholding institutions of the strongly Moslem areas of Java proved sufficiently well-organized to hold their own against the secular nationalist and communist parties even where social problems would otherwise have been expected to present those secular parties with great opportunities. The Moslem areas possessed their own legal system with judges and courts of law, their own educational system which instructed youth in traditional Moslem views rather than mobilizing them into secular politics, their own social groups and cultural activities, and also their own active and important political parties. The Moslem institutions also owned large pieces of land and thus functioned as sources of land and status for their communities. Their presence in the individual villages assured perpetuation of the personal ties which keep peasants conservative--as opposed to those areas where private, secular landowners would be coopted into an urban capitalist system and the peasants would accordingly become radicalized. In short, Islam had the institutional infrastructure to maintain its own ideological consensus. Elsewhere the secular parties quickly gained mass followings in Indonesia.

Whereas the Moslem political organizations were based on the Moslem leaders and institutions, the nationalist peasant or rural organizations became based on secular ties between the leadership of the nationalist independence movement and the better off elements of village society, and the Communist (PKI) peasant organizations were based on outreach by

of large peasant organizations such as the Sakti and the BTI, expanded rapidly. The PKI emerged as one of Indonesia's four largest parties in the election of 1955--a ruralizing election.

PKI policies consistently emphasized agrarian interests as opposed to urban industrial interests. The details of agrarian policies, however, changed in crucial ways over time. Prior to 1954, PKI and BTI advocated nationalization of all land, a policy that created fear among the peasants. Subsequently they backed off to advocacy of distribution of foreign and Indonesian landlords' land among the small peasants. However, conservative elements succeeded in blocking enforcement of legislation designed to regulate tenancy and to impose ceilings on land ownership. Meanwhile population growth continued to exacerbate existing land shortages. By the early 1960s, the PKI pushed for more rapid and drastic reforms, purging the relatively conservative members of the BTI and making a vigorous effort to spread populist and egalitarian ideology. By mid-1965 the BTI had grown to nine million members. All these developments after 1960 took place under the umbrella of a PKI policy of participation in a broad national front (Nasakom) led by Sukarno. However when the front split apart and Sukarno fell, the PKI and its associated peasant organizations were destroyed--at least temporarily.

Although the PKI and the Hukbalahaps pursued similar stated policies, the social conditions of the peasantry in Java were quite different from those in the Philippines. Java had no landlordism comparable to that in the Philippines. Only 1000 landlords in all Indonesia held more than 24 hectares in 1963-64. The problem in Java was acute land scarcity rather than severe social inequality. In contrast with Central Luzon, where

According to Mortimer, the rural Javanese economy described by Clifford Gertz as agricultural involution, namely the super-intensive cultivation of tiny plots of land by large numbers of people, had begun to give way to a system where a minority farmed plots (which admittedly continued to be very tiny) while a majority became unemployed. In particular, continued rise in population, together with the advent in 1960 of the widespread use of manufactured fertilizer and with the spread of commercially-made decisions in village agriculture, started the decline of agricultural involution. This provided a social situation which the PKI could exploit. In addition, government land reform programs, and laws passed in 1959 that sharecroppers should get a minimum of 50 percent of the crop, both of which failed of enactment because of conservative opposition, gave the PKI another basis of grievances to use in mobilizing the peasants. A more radical 1964 campaign, intended to prepare for unilateral peasant actions, was based on an attack on petty exactions by landlords, money lenders, discount rice buyers, oppressive officials, and corporate agents who underpriced peasant crops, under the slogan "Crush the seven village devils." The substantial success of this campaign, although dissipated in the subsequent collapse of the Sukarno government, demonstrated according to Mortimer that, given leadership, a convincing justification for breaking with deference patterns, and the prospect of material relief, a sizable proportion of the peasant poor showed themselves prepared to break with their conditioning and become politically active.

During the Suharto period, the predominant strategy applied in the rural areas has changed from the peasant mobilization strategy of the

make a good income instead of many people getting a subsistence living. The result is social tensions within the villages, clashes between locals and outsiders, a few invasions of crops by peasants, and clashes with the police. Realizing this, the Suharto government has, according to Mortimer, fallen back on its social base of military urban commercial groups, officials and landlords. But rising social tension and messianic movements, together with the tendency of the military to fragment, and the Phoenix-like ability of the PKI to restore itself, imply a period of future political explosiveness. There is no chance, according to Mortimer, that migration, industrialization, and birth control can work fast enough to solve the above problems.

The Mortimer analysis generated considerable controversy. It was maintained first of all that the situation described by Mortimer, although possibly applicable in parts of Java, was not necessarily applicable to other countries and regions. Mr. Tavanlar pointed out that, in the Philippines, the same person who plants customarily does the harvesting, so that the problem of planters choosing to maximize profit over employment during the harvest period does not arise. Likewise, technology which saves labor has not necessarily led to greater unemployment elsewhere. For instance, the rice hullers which Mortimer cited as causes of unemployment do not cause displacement of labor in the Philippines. The hullers provide better quality rice (because the rice recovered is mostly whole grain), with better whiteness, and the bran is fully recovered for animal feed. The labor "displaced" consists of women, who raise chickens, garden, and undertake other income-generating tasks and therefore are not really displaced.

Malaysia

Karl Von Vorys provided a discussion of Malaysia which yielded a different model of peasant mobilization and also a description of a situation in which political organization of the peasantry can have politically disastrous and economically counterdevelopmental consequences. Whereas peasant mobilization in the Philippines was dominated by class considerations, and peasant mobilization in Indonesia was heavily influenced by religious divisions, particularly divisions within the Moslem religion itself, in Malaysia every aspect of political life including rural political life is dominated by communal cleavages. Malaysian society is 50 percent Malay, 35 percent Chinese, and 15 percent Indian. The peasants are mostly Malays with strong traditional leaders and with a new emerging leadership consisting of secular school teachers. The latter are primarily oriented to Malay nationalism although they are also Moslems.

The principal Malay political organization, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), emerged in struggle against the Chinese and secondarily against the British. Whereas the British sought a homogenized society, the Malay leaders had a sense that the country was a Malay country and that the Chinese were visitors. In 1954-55 a major conflict arose within UMNO because of a breakdown in the agreement whereby top leaders of each communal group would negotiate their relations with the top leaders of other communal groups. Malays' political advantages depended upon continuing ability to mobilize the Malay electorate, but this mobilization produced in 1954-55 a schism between supporters of continued multi-communal state and supporters of a distinctly Malay state. This fundamental social contradiction between the political necessity of mobilizing the Malays

of joining the revolutionary movement if it fails. The peasant presumably calculates the costs, benefits and risks of each approach as if he were a statistician analyzing expected values.

The crucial problem of revolutionary organization in a world of peasant political economists is the problem of collective goods. Just as a rich man in a developed country will use a road without making contributions to pay for it, if society is so ordered as to allow such use, so likewise a peasant economizer will take the view (if he can) that others should make the revolution and he as an individual will enjoy the free ride. To circumvent this problem, revolutionary organization requires a supply of political entrepreneurs dedicated to structuring situations so as to provide incentives for individuals to join the revolutionary organization, together with a social situation which provides such entrepreneurs with substantial opportunities for success. The supply of entrepreneurs is far higher in commercialized areas where skills of organization and communication have been developed in accordance with the needs of a commercial economy.

In what kinds of social structure can such entrepreneurs succeed? One route to an answer would be to look for situations in which the entrepreneur can provide selective incentives for individuals to join. Although that is a sensible approach, there is a weaker form of the question which is more incisive: under which conditions can entrepreneurs convince people that their contributions to the organization would make a difference worth the risk? Here it is crucial to note that people farther above subsistence, such as those in most commercial areas, are more willing to take risks--as one can validate by

Popkin noted that the Hoa Hao were typically very successful at organizing in the most commercialized areas, whereas the communists typically did best in subsistence regions where the people were willing to accept harshness in order to get subsistence. The Hoa Hao originally opposed markets but had to change because the peasants wanted benefits. The Hoa Hao provided roles for women and emphasized village decentralization rather than rigid hierarchy.

The rational political economy model contrasts with James Scott's moral economy model.* The political economy model asks where social norms come from, for instance whether they come from the landlord or from peasant interests, and explores the conditions under which norms change and the conditions under which they are more likely to be violated. It then treats behavior as determined by a cost/benefit calculation conditioned by norms. The moral economy model, on the other hand, takes norms as given and asserts that the peasant becomes indignant or angry when norms are violated. For instance, if the balance of exchange between landlord and peasant is shifted away from what was traditionally regarded as appropriate, or if the peasant's subsistence is threatened, then the peasant becomes angry and resorts to violence or revolution. The moral economy model rejects the political economy model on grounds that political economy is too easily conceived of in purely economic income terms whereas peasants frequently choose security rather than income. Likewise the moral economy model's supporters believe that an emphasis on rational calculation ignores the moral indignation and anger which lie behind some peasant revolts. To this, advocates of the political economy model reply that they do not ignore moral norms, that indeed such norms can easily be incorporated

* Cf. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale, 1976).

of the game. For instance, in England after the Black Plague peasants demanded changes in the rules of the game in their favor. There was substantial agreement with the assertion by Popkin that if one loosens the constraints on the moral economy approach, for instance, allowing for the possibility that norms would change over time, then the moral economy becomes subsumed by the political economy approach.

Discussion turned to what is distinctive about peasant motivation as opposed to the motivation of other social groups. There was general agreement that neither security nor income provided totally satisfactory explanations of peasant behavior. Jeremias Montemayor argued that peasants are motivated by essentially the same concerns as other people but are in a special situation. They possess special concern for security in land and work because of the danger of losing subsistence. They put particularly high value on promises of dignity because of a history of being degraded and despised generation after generation; this special sensitivity can become linked to the question of national dignity. They also seek a sense of belonging, an identity based on an organization of class equals. Like others, they seek increased income, an integrated meaning of life through religion or ideology, and they respond to attractive leadership. Luis Taruc emphasized the importance to peasants of dignity as opposed to the emphases on food or income so often attributed as the primary peasant motivation by Western scholars. Taruc pointed out that Central Luzon peasants live better than their counterparts elsewhere but are the most rebellious. He attributed this to their higher political consciousness and tradition of struggle and argued that social values and principles were crucial determinants of political organization. This directly

motivations, therefore, must be supplemented by discussions of the larger organizations and organizational context within which the peasants make their choices.

The first theory of organization and organizational context was provided by Mancur Olson, who focused on the relationship between economic growth and the scale and quality of organizations in less developed countries.* He began by noting that explanations of underdevelopment in terms of lack of capital, lack of skills and education, and cultures incompatible with rapid economic development, failed to explain the persistence of underdevelopment. Capital could be imported without difficulty if its marginal product would be high. Many poor countries have higher proportions of higher educated people than did the now-developed nations when they were developing. Market behavior appropriate to economic development appears to be even more evident in a Middle Eastern bazaar than in an American supermarket. More generally, any factor of production which can be imported cannot be a great obstacle to growth, for the same reasons given above for capital. Since this is the case, and since culture is not a crucial variable (at least so far as it affects individual behavior), attention should focus on the way factors of production are organized and controlled rather than exclusively on the factors themselves. Moreover, it should be noted that, in an age of virtually universal anti-imperialism, dependence on organization and control by a foreign government or by a group of foreigners, is unacceptable and therefore ruled out.**

*See Mancur Olson, "Prolegomena to a Theory of Economic Growth and National Development," prepared for the SEADAG Conference.

**For a possible counter-example see Brazil, where much of the economy is run by foreigners but effective sovereignty is achieved by other means.

Olson extended the logic of his argument from economic enterprises to governments, arguing that the size of governments and countries is determined by the logic of economies and diseconomies of scale. Holding per capita income constant, Olson argues that a large nation will obtain just as much per capita strength out of a given size army as a smaller country will, but will acquire that at a lower per capita cost; thus there is a tendency for large countries to displace smaller ones. However, especially in developing areas, the enormous difficulties in controlling and administering large territories, given the problems of communication and transportation, mean that excessively large countries will become administering overextended in the manner of the ancient empires and will tend to break up. Thus the optimum size country will be one large enough to obtain substantial economies of scale for things like armies, but small enough to incur a minimum of diseconomies of scale from administrative overextension.

According to Olson, governments in less developed countries are thus hindered by the problems of administering a large country. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the job of government is providing public goods--since it is far more difficult to assess the performance of bureaucracies which provide collective goods than of organizations that produce market outputs. Olson went on to explain the problems of corruption, nepotism, and ineffectiveness, as well as the tremendous political instability and guerilla warfare of developing nations, by reference to the problems of providing large scale effective organization in a context of poverty. He applied this argument both to pre-nineteenth century western countries and to today's developing countries.

The second general organizational approach to the problems of peasant organization was provided by William Overholt,* who began by contrasting Marx's famous remarks on why French peasants could never become an effective political organization with Edgar Snow's description in Red Star Over China of the extraordinary degree of organization of the Chinese peasantry achieved during the Communist Revolution. The contrast is even more striking because, given the extreme poverty of China and the extraordinary size of the society, the Chinese peasantry should be one of the world's most difficult to organize. (For instance apply Mancur Olson's theory to the Chinese case.) If one takes the arguments explaining why French peasants could not organize, then one comes to wrong conclusions about China. Likewise, given the experience of the Huks in the Philippines, if one takes the Chinese model and applies it to the Philippines, then one is also likely to obtain erroneous conclusions. One therefore needs a set of variables and propositions which yield general statements about peasants' abilities to organize and about the special problems peasants have, but which also differentiate clearly the different problems faced by French, Chinese, and Filipino peasantries. One needs in fact a general theory of the conditions under which social groups can organize.

A survey of the social science literatures applicable to the question of the conditions under which the social groups can organize leaves two basic conclusions. First, organization theory, which would seem to be the logical starting point for a discussion of the problems of social groups organization, turns out not to provide use-

*See William H. Overholt, "Under What Conditions Can Peasants and Other Social Groups Organize for Political Purposes?" prepared for the SEADAG Conference. Also see his Political Revolution (Westview Press, 1977).

as literacy, physical isolation, poverty, urbanization, social homogeneity, and so forth, and analyze their implications for groups' organizational capabilities by looking at their effects on the six kinds of resources a group needs in order to organize.

Given that a group possesses some level of organizational resources, it must choose the way in which it will use those resources. That is, it must choose an organizational strategy. An organizational strategy consists of a set of boundaries around the group together with a structure for the group. For instance a peasant organization may find itself short of leadership and therefore may want to ally itself with intellectuals from the city. Then it may find that, in order to cope with an adversary organized into bureaucracies and a military arm, it must choose a very hierarchical and disciplined kind of organization. On the other hand, if most peasants in an area perceive their interests as best pursued by participation in democratic electoral politics, then they may choose a set of patron-client relationships with landlords who have access to higher level politics, and they may rely upon loose, informal, intermittent kinds of organization.

In choosing an organizational strategy, peasants or other social groups face two kinds of restraints. One restraint is imposed by the goals they seek and the kind of environment they are operating in. For instance, if they seek a revolution and therefore have to fight a government, they will have to choose a highly disciplined, hierarchical, military-style organization as suggested above. The second constraint is imposed by their own skills and other organizational resources. As the paper demonstrates, the maximum discipline a group can obtain will

between young and old, and to form them into extremely disciplined hierarchical organizations. They then use these organizations to acquire funds, territorial control, and weapons, which were in turn deployed in accordance with a brilliant military strategy against a Kuomintang organization that had been shattered by the Japanese and had proved incapable of either efficient organization or effective military strategy.

On the other hand, in the Philippines, attempts to exploit the same social divisions came up against the facts that landlord-tenant ties were very strong in many parts of the Philippines and that tensions between young and old and between male and female were not particularly salient because of a relatively egalitarian family structure. Because of a tradition of informal village social organization, there was resistance at all levels to the kind of discipline required of a revolutionary organization. For the same reason, there was an inability to transcend personal ties that made it difficult to create a revolutionary organization involving more than a few linguistic groups. The conflict strategy of the Filipino Communists, unlike that of the Chinese, relied heavily on attempts to improve social harmony rather than on attempts to exacerbate conflict. This emphasis on social harmony further eroded chances of building a highly disciplined and hierarchical revolutionary organization.

Overholt asserted that conflict strategies could be divided into: (1) those directed against the opponent's organizational resources, for instance those designed to cut off the opponent's food or to deprive him of communications or to deprive him of motivation through reforms; (2) those designed to undercut his organizational structure,

The high effectiveness of the formal organizations of China and more generally Northeast Asia was noted. The organizational conditions of the Northeast Asian societies in China, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have facilitated at various times revolutionary organization, the formation of peasant organizations to implement land reform, and the ability of several of these societies to industrialize with extreme rapidity. Overholt maintained that the advantages derived from superior resources, and in particular from traditions of family and village organization of a formal, disciplined kind which adapts easily to modern revolutionary or industrial purposes. Southeast Asia on the other hand more frequently displays informal, relatively loose village and family organizations which are more easily adaptable to democratic political parties and perhaps to post-industrial kinds of economic activity. Carl Lande and Donald Zagoria argued that Northeast Asia has these organizational advantages in part because of (1) unilinear kinship systems, (2) a history of strong states, and (3) a greater degree of cultural homogeneity than exists in Southeast Asia.

James Scott argued that ecology, family structure, and so forth, are unimportant in accounting for peasant organization, and maintained that the two key factors are the state and the market. The impact of the state on the peasantry was felt for the first time in a strong way when colonial capitation taxes and others were imposed. Likewise the spread of a capitalist market created village markets, uniform tenancy laws, uniform market impacts, and so forth. The result is a set of uniform impacts on the peasantry which stimulate a broad and uniform response. The key problem of peasant organization, in turn, consists

and to replace licentiousness with social discipline. These could not be done by election. The particular Martial Law programs that have tended to break the conservative "coalition" have included the land transfer program, the breaking of the sugar monopoly, the public land settlement program, the sale of shares of Rural Banks, and the sale of stocks of the biggest companies. Louis Taruc supported these observations by Montemayor and noted that Marcos had been willing to accept the building of a united front program advocated by Taruc, including such groups as FAITH, FARM, and HUKVETS.

Mr. Tavanlar commented that, in the case of the Philippines, Marcos is not going as far or as fast as Tavanlar had originally recommended, but that he was proceeding on many fronts toward income redistribution. Mr. Von Vorys perceived parallels between the Filipino enthusiasm for Martial Law and the situation of 10 to 15 years ago in Pakistan. He questioned whether military regimes deliver greater efficiency, and commented that any increase in efficiency usually depreciates very quickly. The military's superior coercive capacity is balanced by a frequent inability to generate persuasive capacity. Moreover, he noted that an officer corps can prove socially homogeneous and socially linked to a conservative coalition just as a legislature can. Carl Lande rounded out this assessment of the Philippine situation by noting that, in addition to coercion and persuasion, Marcos can employ economic incentives. Since the personal situation of President Marcos makes it impossible for him to employ idealism, he relies extremely heavily on economic carrots and sticks. Along with some successes there have been major administrative failures, such as sugar sales and oil purchases. The key to the future is what

